Abstract Nonprofit hospitals have traditionally enjoyed charitable exemption from real estate taxes because they provide specific social benefits. However, in the past three decades, major health policy changes at the federal level-most significantly, implementation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs-have weakened this rationale. Federal tax regulations during this period have changed in ways that complement these federal health programs and the accompanying federal interests in encouraging efficiency and performance uniformity among hospitals. States and local governments, however, have different interests, and these may favor a strict set of tax exemption standards that disregard efficiency and elevate the importance of a measurable level of charitable service. Their divergent policies rest on a fundamental value judgment about whether nonprofit hospital care is intrinsically charitable or not. Increasingly, this judgment may be forced upon state courts and legislation by local governments seeking new tax revenues through the elimination of hospitals' exemption from real estate taxes.
This fragmented state of affairs did not result from happenstance, nor is it without its supporters. Both Madisonian and contemporary interestgroup liberalism are based on a fragmented, pluralistic model in which the absence of a coordinated system serves as a defense against centralized control and tyranny. And many people champion the concept of a "laboratory of the states," that is, the fact that states can experiment with differing approaches to social problems and benefit from each other's mistakes and successes.
Its real and potential benefits aside, fragmentation has contributed to the present state of increasingly divergent tax policies being promulgated at the federal and state levels.' Given this divergence, it is troubling that the public debate about hospital tax exemption has tended to focus on "commercial" or "business" behavior of nonprofit hospitals, without regard for the reasons why these institutions function as they do or why their behavior has changed. The case against hospitals as charities is being made without explicit recognition that the rules for charitable tax exemption-as well as the fiscal and political motives that support them-differ at the state and federal levels. We believe that knowledge of the policy history and diverse legal bases for hospital tax exemption can be useful both for states deciding whether and how to continue such exemption and for federal policymakers considering their impact on the states.
In this article, we examine first the common law basis for hospitals' charitable exemption along with the social benefits usually cited as the rationale for charitable status. Next is an overview of federal health and tax policy changes affecting hospitals in the past three decades, focusing on their implications for the social benefits of charitable exemption. Third, judicial decisions in the three states whose highest courts have recently addressed and reinterpreted hospital charitable exemption are compared to present federal law. Finally, the implications of diverging federal and state policies toward nonprofit hospitals are considered.
Common Law and the Social Benefits of Charitable Exemption
The governmental pattern of permitting tax exemption to encourage socially desirable behavior, and then carefully circumscribing the exemption to prevent abuse or unintended loss of revenue, seems to have emerged early in English law. In 1600, Parliament provided a list of valid charitable purposes, which included "relief of aged, impotent and poor people," Statute of Charitable Uses, Stat. 43 Eliz. I. The list was meant to be suggestive rather than all-inclusive, but it has served as a continuing reference point for development of the law of charitable trusts throughout the centuries since.
American common law, as summarized in the Restatement of the Law of Trusts 2d,2 defines a charitable trust as "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property . . . subjecting the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose" (American Law Institute 1959: 210) . The trustee can be a corporation as well as an individual. The concept of "community benefit" is integral to a charitable trust in the sense that its benefits must be given to the community or an indefinite group of persons, not to any particular individual or group. In particular, the promotion of health is deemed to be "of such social interest to the community as to fall within the concept of charity" (American Law Institute 1959: 248) . In this context, promotion of health means prevention, cure, or treatment of disease.
Furthermore, the common law considers as charitable a trust to establish or maintain a hospital even though patients pay for their care, as long as no "profits arising from its operation are . . . applied for purposes other than the maintenance or improvement of the institution or some other charitable purpose" (American Law Institute 1959: 255) . Finally, the charitable nature of caring for the sick and preventing illness is not tainted or altered either by the "mere fact that persons who are not objects of charity incidentally benefit" or because "its operation results in a profit, provided that the profits are to be applied only to charitable purposes" (American Law Institute 1959: 265-66) .
The benefits traditionally expected of and provided by nonprofit hospitals individually to their communities and collectively to American society have recently been articulated in many and various policy rationales for the continuing tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals. A review of this literature reveals that these perceived social benefits can be divided into three broad categories: (1) public trusteeship of assets, including use of surplus earnings, for the benefit of the community; (2) a disincentive for private gain offsetting the information disparity between provider and patient; and (3) relief of the governmental burden of providing services not available from or adequately supplied by private enterprise. In the discussion that follows, each of these rationales is compared and contrasted with the requisite characteristics of a charitable hospital under the common law.
Public Trusteeship and Pluralism
The nonprofit hospital is responsible for using its assets for the benefit of no particular individual or organization, but of the whole community. Community benefit, in this sense, includes care of the poor but certainly goes beyond. Seay and Vladek (1988: 15) elaborated on the concept of public trusteeship by pointing out that the standard to which hospital trustees are accountable involves a "critical linkage" between the values and needs of the particular community and its voluntary or nonprofit hospital.
The term that captures this idea of critical linkage is pluralism. Though it is sometimes used to refer to the American economic system's three component parts (public or governmental, private or commercial, and nonprofit or voluntary), it is also used to describe one of the social benefits attributed to the nonprofit hospital system. Used in the latter sense, hospital pluralism reflects "the heterogeneous and evolving medical, social, economic, religious, and cultural needs and priorities in American society" (Guggenheimer 1988: 38) . Pluralism is less of a mandate or a constraint on an organization than it is a consequence or a necessary feature of public trusteeship. In theory, each hospital should be governed for the benefit of the community as a whole. But each has a character and a mission distinct from those of other hospitals-even those in the same community. If the underlying goal of public trusteeship is to assure community-wide availability of hospital services, then diversity among institutions is desirable. Falcone and Warren (1988) considered tax exemptions from a health policy perspective as a price that society pays for its preference that health care be pluralistic. Their assumption was that pluralism's greatest value is its potential for assuring access to health care services that would otherwise require a direct government subsidy. They acknowledged that this potential had not in fact been realized and that the costs of such a system well exceeded the value of the services it renders because of administrative overhead, tax subsidies for employer-sponsored health insurance plans, and income and property tax exemptions to hospitals.
Public trusteeship is required by state laws of nonprofit incorporation, which typically rule out stock ownership and prohibit distribution of earnings, or of assets upon dissolution, to private interests. Thus, the common law of charitable trusts imposes no further condition with its definition of public trusteeship, except to specify that surplus earnings must only be used for "charitable" purposes. Pluralism, in contrast, is not a value stated in the common law of charitable trusts, which makes no reference to an institution's culture, location, or professional orientation.
Profit Disincentive
When consumers want a product or service about which price or quality information is inaccessible, they will likely choose providers that can be trusted not to overreach this relative lack of information for private profit (Clark 1980) . Similarly, when a society wants to encourage innovation or service development, it relies upon organizations that can bear the risks of uncertain marketability (Schlesinger et al. 1987) . The nonprofit form of organization meets both of these needs. Under the theory of profit disincentive, nonprofit hospitals can be trusted to provide appropriate, high-quality care, to conduct research to improve patient care and advance technology, and to participate in educating health care professionals. The price of trust may be a loss of efficiency (Arrington and Haddock 1990) , since the profit disincentive also implies that the personal financial rewards given to nonprofit managers are limited in relation to those given to for-profit managers (Weisbrod 1988: 23) .
The value of the profit disincentive is reflected in the common law of charitable trusts, which speaks of profits from care of the sick as being permissible but applicable only to the charitable purpose. Thus, patients are assured that the hospital is not primarily concerned about profiting from their care. Even if payment for care produces a surplus, the patient can trust that this will ultimately be used only to improve care or to create greater access to care throughout the community, not to enrich any individuals.
Relief of Government Burden
This standard for hospital charitable exemption means that, without a nonprofit hospital system, care of the sick would fall to either private enterprise or government. But private enterprise might not accept the burden of caring for those who cannot pay or of providing unprofitable services at an adequate level-forcing government to fill the breach. Along with accepting these burdens, nonprofit hospitals would be in a sense doubly taxed if they were also required to contribute tax revenues to government. More than the other social benefits of tax exemption, this one represents a "quid pro quo" in the form of mutual expectations between the charitable hospital and society.
The common law of charitable trusts as applied to hospitals does not require them to give away free services to the poor. Nevertheless, present supporters, no less than critics such as Herzlinger and Krasker (1987) , of nonprofit hospitals' tax exemptions seem to prefer quantifiable charity care as a qualifying standard. Among the supporters, Gray and McNerney have said (1986: 1526) the amounts of charitable contributions that an institution receives, plus the amount of taxes that it does not have to pay by virtue of its tax-exempt status, should be reasonably related to the amount of uncompensated service that it performs in the form of charity care, unprofitable standby capacity, unsponsored research, and institutionally subsidized educational activities.
Some analysts have focused on the provision of services not otherwise available as a way of evaluating hospitals against the "relief of government burden" standard. For example, Friedman et al. (1989) analyzed an extensive set of diversified noninpatient hospital services, many of which were unprofitable and did not generate inpatient referrals. Nonprofit hospitals were found to offer these services in significantly greater proportion than-often double-that of for-profits. This analysis added weight to nonprofit hospitals' contention that they can meet a quid-pro-quo standard for tax exemption. Unfortunately, this line of argument tends to blur the distinction between community benefit as a goal of public trusteeship and community benefit as quantifiable charitable service. The former is a necessary feature of a charitable trust organization in the common law analysis; the latter is not.
Federal Policy Changes in Relation to the Social Benefits of Exemption
Both federal and state laws of charitable exemption are based in the common law but have changed independently over time. Thus, problematically, many tax-exempt hospitals are currently operating under divergent sets of tax policies. One set, at the federal level, is relatively liberal and based on the common law principle that hospital care is intrinsically charitable. Some states' exemption laws are also based on intrinsic charitability. But in other states, a second set of exemption policies can be quite strict and based in particular on the requirement that the hospital must provide relief of a governmental burden in the form of charity care for the poor. In this section, we take a close look at several key changes in federal tax and health policies as affecting nonprofit hospitals and consider their implications for the social benefits usually cited as justifying charitable exemption.
Major changes in federal health policy have taken place since 1965, most notably the creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs and the reform of Medicare hospital payment through the Prospective Payment System (PPS). These changes were not designed consciously to affect federal tax exemption laws as applied to hospitals. However, occurring during this same period were several changes in federal tax policy that directly affected private nonprofit hospitals. These were the availability of tax-exempt bond financing for privately owned hospitals, a relaxation of the federal standard for section 501(c)(3) charitable status, and a reinterpretation of the federal standard for bonus compensation of executives.
Taken together, these health and tax policy changes have undermined the social benefit justifications for hospitals' charitable exemption. We review them chronologically.
Creation of Medicare and Medicaid Programs
Before 1965, private health insurance was the only widely available source of third-party payment for hospital care, and it was available primarily to the middle-class working-age population and their families (Stevens 1989: 253) . The elderly, the unemployed, and the poor relied on their own resources, or on limited public programs, or on hospital charity for care. According to Stevens, the uninsured were "covered by public assistance (in whole or in part), by cross-subsidizing within the hospital, or occasionally by free care from hospital endowments or gifts" (1989: 253). In 1965, Congress passed the amendments to the Social Security Act that created the Medicare and Medicaid programs, thus assuming for government a direct responsibility to pay for some of the health care of two vulnerable population groups-the elderly and the poor. A quarter-century later, these programs are criticized for their failure to allocate resources fairly between poor families needing primary care and the elderly needing long-term care; for their use of restrictive eligibility criteria, which leave many of the poor with no coverage; and for their benefit gaps (Oberg and Polich 1988; Lave and Goldman 1990; Taube et al. 1990 ). Nevertheless, these programs have succeeded in increasing access to hospital care among many who previously had no means to obtain it (Davis 1976; Donabedian 1976; Hausner 1977; Orr and Miller 1981; Long and Settle 1984) . In doing so, Medicare and Medicaid substantially altered the meaning of "relief of government burden" as applied to hospital charitable exemptions.
An at least partial rejection of the pluralistic ideal was implicit in the adoption of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, since the private sector was no longer relied upon as extensively to assure access to health care. A comparison of statistics illustrates this point. In 1935, 10.2 percent of nonprofit hospital income was from tax-supported care (Stevens 1989: 183) . Fifty years later, hospital net revenue (roughly comparable to "income" in the earlier statistic) from government sources was 41.3 percent (Health Care Financing Administration 1987: 14) . Throughout this time, hospitals have continued to care for patients without ability to pay and without third-party sponsorship. And though accounting for charity care separately from other kinds of uncompensated care (bad debt, con-tractual allowance, and government underpayments) is not precise, one estimate says that only an amount equal to 1.6 percent of total payments to hospitals in 1982 was given away as charity care (Sloan et al. 1986: 19) . Proponents of the quid-pro-quo basis for determining tax-exempt status need to be concerned that charity care at this level might not equal the value of charitable tax exemption (Health Policy Institute 1990).3
"Government" whose burden is relieved by hospital charity care is not a unitary concept, since there are multiple levels that might benefit from and/or help to support nonprofit hospitals. Under Medicare and Medicaid, this relief tends to flow to federal and state governments, at least in the sense that those programs do not consistently pay the full cost of hospital care given to the sponsored populations. Burden, on the other hand, tends to fall upon local governments. They do not typically sponsor poor or elderly patients in privately owned hospitals and so derive little benefit from these nonprofits' charity care-regardless of whether this is defined to include discounts. Before Medicare and Medicaid they of course bore more of this burden than they do now. But political recollections of health care before 1965 are dim. Today, local governments may tend to see hospitals as a burden, consuming municipal and county services while enjoying exemption (under state laws) from paying local taxes.
Charitable Status under IRS Section 501 (c)(3)
Prior to 1969, the Internal Revenue Service had required in Revenue Ruling 56-185,1956 C.B. 202, that a hospital would qualify as a corporation organized for charitable purposes (and thereby for section 501(c)(3) federal income tax exemption) only if it were "operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for those who are able and expected to pay." However, with Revenue Ruling 69-545,1969-2 C.B. 117, this policy changed to emphasize that the promotion of health is itself a charitable purpose: a hospital 3. Under the assumptions stated for the Health Policy Institute study (1990) for determining nonprofit hospitals' potential tax liabilities, the amount of real estate tax resulting from a loss of charitable exemption ranged from 3.1 percent to 8.3 percent of net patient revenues prior to exemption loss. In that study, a "tax impact model" was applied to a set of prototypical hospitals in Pennsylvania municipalities. Its tax predictions could vary substantially when applied to actual hospitals and to other taxing jurisdictions. A description of the model with a discussion of its applications and real estate valuation assumptions has been published separately (Potter 1992 that "ordinarily limits admissions to those who can pay the cost of their hospitalization, either themselves, or through private health insurance, or with the aid of public programs such as Medicare" can nonetheless qualify for section 50l(c)(3)-exempt status, Rev. Rul. 69-545. Fox and Schaffer (1991) reviewed the regulatory process that led to Revenue Ruling 69-545 in careful detail. IRS officials, in interviews reported by these authors, asserted their intention not to change but rather to correct the regulatory definition of charity as applied to hospitals. Their position was that the use of the word "charity" in section 501(c)(3) was intended to carry the common law meaning, not the connotation of free care. According to this explanation, it would seem that Revenue Ruling 56-185 was an anomaly or a mistake; and that the 1969 ruling simply corrected it (Fox and Schaffer 1991: 257) . Whatever the IRS's intention, the impact of the new definition was perceived to be significant indeed.
Revenue Ruling 69-545 was challenged in the federal courts by a welfare rights advocacy group. The trial court invalidated the new regulation, Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.C. 1973) , but the appellate court disagreed, reaffirming the common law concept of hospital care as intrinsically ~haritable:~ While it is true that in the past Congress and the federal courts have conditioned a hospital's charitable status on the level of free or below cost care that it provided for indigents, there is no authority for the conclusion that the determination of "charitable" status was always to be so limited. Such an inflexible construction fails to recognize the changing economic, social and technological precepts and values of contemporary society.
In the field of health care, the changes have been dramatic. Hospitals in the early part of this nation's history were almshouses supported by philanthropy and serving almost exclusively the sick poor. Today, hospitals are the primary community health facility for both rich and poor. Philanthropy accounts for only a minute percentage of the hospital's total operating costs. . . . The institution of Medicare and Medicaid in the last decade combined with the rapid growth of medical and hospital insurance has greatly reduced the number of poor people requiring free or below cost hospital services. Much of that decrease has been real-ized since the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 56-185. . . . Thus, it appears that the rationale upon which the limited definition of "charitable" was predicated has largely disappeared. To continue to base the "charitable" status of a hospital strictly on the relief it provides for the poor fails to account for these major changes in the area of health care.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 E2d 1278 , 1287 -89 (D.C. Cir. 1974 ), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976 .
Thus, whether abandoning the 1956 federal standard for hospital charitability in 1969 was a matter of correcting a mistake or of changing with the times, it was clear at least by 1974 that federal tax policy did not require free care to the poor as a condition for income tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals.
A further, related policy change came about in 1983. Before then, the Internal Revenue Service appeared to require that a hospital maintain an open emergency room to qualify for federal tax exemption. Revenue Ruling 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, eased this requirement in cases in which the hospital could show that the community's emergency room need was otherwise adequately served. Congress thereafter grew concerned over persistent allegations of "patient dumping," or refusing to treat indigent patients, and required in COBRA of 1985, Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd, and subsequent amendments that hospitals participating in Medicare and having emergency facilities must treat all emergency patients regardless of ability to Pay.
The issue of hospital charity care continues to be raised in Congress from time to time in the form of proposals to reinstate the pre-1969 standard for federal income tax exemption or otherwise to impose a precise free-care obligation on nonprofit hospitals. To date, however, no such proposal has gained enough support to be voted out of committee. Cohodes and Kinkead (1984: 18) observed that Medicare and Medicaid, by adopting cost-based reimbursement principles and treating depreciation and interest expenses as reimbursable costs, "greatly expanded hospitals' capacity to carry debt." Nevertheless, three years after these programs were implemented, only 34 percent of hospital construction funds were derived from debt financing, and tax-exempt bonds for private hospitals were "virtually unknown" (Cohodes and Kinkead 1984: 22) .
Access to Tax-Exempt Bond Financing
Under section 103 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, municipalities were allowed to issue bonds whose interest paid to bondholders was exempt from income taxation. During the 1950s and 1960s, the IRS permitted municipal bond proceeds to be used by certain private nonprofit corporations; however, the municipality was required to retain full legal title to the property acquired with bond proceeds, Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24 . This changed after the Tax Reform Act of 1969, when regulations effectively eliminated this restriction and permitted bond obligations issued on behalf of charitable hospitals to be secured by liens that terminated with the bond obligation, Treas. Reg. § 1. 103-7 and -8 (1973) . Almost immediately, nonprofit hospitals began to draw on this new source of capital, and their dependence on it thereafter grew steadily. By 1983, about 80 percent of hospital construction was financed by debt, and 80 percent of that was in the form of tax-exempt bonds (Cohodes and Kinkead 1984: 22) .
While a major benefit to hospital expansion and technological development, access to the bond market has also been viewed as a threat to the values that underlie public trusteeship and the pluralistic ideal. Ginzberg acknowledged that the advent of bond financing as well as reimbursement for depreciation costs had reduced the importance of hospital trustees in their once "critical role in raising capital" (1991: 183). Stevens noted that access to the bond market had jeopardized hospitals' independence by making them less responsive to their immediate communities than to the interests of debt holders and bond-rating firms (1989: 295-305) . This is because a hospital's capacity to carry debt, as measured by bond-rating firms, is a factor in determining the rate of interest it will pay for capital. Cleverly and Nutt (1984) concluded that the rating agencies' criteria provide an "incentive for bigness" even when expansion is unnecessary in terms of community need and accessibility.
There may also be a disincentive for hospitals to "relieve governmental burden" built into the bond-rating process. Cleverly and Nutt (1984) reported that the percentage of a hospital's Medicaid financing was a negative factor in bond rating by at least one agency, justified by Medicaid's poor reimbursement and consequent adverse effect on profitability. This problem has been exacerbated in recent years. According to industry sources, in fiscal year 1991 hospitals expected to lose an average of 22 cents on each dollar of care provided to Medicaid patients (Rettig 1991: 4) .
It is certainly possible that factors other than Medicaid underpayment are "critically important in determining hospital financial condition" (Ashby 1991: 17) . Still, hospitals that accept deeply discounted Medicaid reimbursement and serve large Medicaid populations can be penalized in their access to capital on the basis of financial condition. Such hospitals might more easily meet a "relief of government burden" standard; but the necessity to access capital through the private bond market is, at present, a high-priority concern for many hospitals. Given a choice between a stronger operating margin and expanded outreach services to a low-income community, a hospital desirous of acquiring cutting-edge technologies using bond financing might well deemphasize the latter.
Medicare Prospective Payment System
Cost-based reimbursement by Medicare for most inpatient hospital services was replaced with prospective or case-based reimbursement under 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act that became effective in fiscal year 1984. Medicare's PPS created powerful incentives for efficiency by setting a price for care, forcing the hospital to take a loss if its costs exceeded that price but allowing it to keep the surplus if its costs were lower.
One result of payment reform was to reduce the rate of Medicare hospital cost increases (Feder et al. 1987) . Since hospitals could no longer acquire sophisticated equipment and staff with the certainty that their costs would be fully covered, staffs were reduced, and the growth rate of expenses for supplies and services was cut sharply, at least in the year immediately following PPS's implementation (Health Care Financing Administration 1985) . The Congressional Budget Office recently reported that laws passed in the 1980s resulted in Medicare spending 1.9 percent less per year than otherwise would have occurred, with most of the savings attributable to hospital payments (Langwell 1991) . This modest gain in efficiency may have been achieved without the feared negative effect on hospitals' willingness to treat uninsured patients (Sloan et al. 1988) .
Nevertheless, PPS has a tendency to undermine the value of public trusteeship by weakening the discretion of the individual hospital to allocate its assets and earnings for the benefit of the community. Because of Medicare's predominance in most hospitals' payer mix, decisions to introduce a new inpatient service, or to expand or eliminate an existing one, tend to be influenced by whether Medicare cost-based reimbursement is available or, alternatively, whether the hospital can provide the service at a cost equal to or less than the PPS rate. For example, PPS excludes psychiatric, rehabilitation, and alcohol and drug treatment units in general hospitals, leaving such units eligible for cost-based reimbursement. Between 1984 (the first full year of PPS) and 1986, the numbers of all such units increased by 38.5 percent (Hatten and Gibson 1987: 97) . Though PPS was certainly not the only force for change acting upon the hospital system at this time, and though this increase may not have been intended by PPS policy, an increase of this magnitude in so short a time frame indicates the strong influence of PPS upon individual hospital decision making.
It is noteworthy that during the 1980s certain Medicare coverage and reimbursement policies were introduced with the avowed intention of influencing hospital resource allocation and service configuration decisions, including the rural hospital swing-bed program (Shaughnessy et al. 1988) and the addition of ambulatory surgical benefits (Helbing and Latta 1988) .
PPS may also tend to undermine the profit disincentive in nonprofit hospitals. Prospective payment encourages attention to the cost of each patient's care, compared with the set price to be paid for care. The hospital's incentive is to try to break even or to realize a surplus if possible. Attention to the cost of each patient's stay detracts from the underlying value of the profit disincentive, which is meant to position the hospital to make choices about medical care on behalf of the patient without the potential conflict of economic self-interest. Though physicians' and administrators' personal ethics may overcome the conflict, the presence of the economic incentive nevertheless threatens patients' trust.
Public policymakers' concern about this threat is suggested in the regulations initially promulgated to implement PPS. Following a statement of "Beneficiary Impact ," the introduction to these regulations acknowledged that the Health Care Financing Administration would "monitor admission and physician practice patterns to ensure that beneficiaries continue to receive care that is reasonable and necessary and of good quality," Interim Final Rules for the Prospective Payment System, 48 F.R. at 39806 (September 1, 1983) . This monitoring has, in fact, been vigorously pursued. The inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services (Kusserow 1988) reported that only 1.1 percent of Medicare patients sampled during fiscal year 1985 had been prematurely discharged; however, he explained the background of this study as follows:
The [PPS] financial incentives might induce some physicians and hospitals to withhold needed services and discharge patients prematurely, thereby increasing profits, while placing beneficiaries at risk. Evidence of such occurrences began appearing shortly after PPS was implemented. Once the issue was identified, it sparked media attention, congressional hearings, and studies by various Government agencies and consumer groups.
The point is not that premature hospital discharges are rampant under PPS; the evidence contradicts this. Rather, there is a widespread and persistent belief that the PPS incentives encourage such abuse. From the standpoint of a political decision to challenge in court or to curtail by legislation hospitals' charitable tax exemption, the perception and the mistrust may be as important as the reality.
Profit Sharing by Nonprofit Executives
Excessive compensation of officers and executives is a form of inurement or private benefit from a charitable organization's profits that is prohibited both under the common law of charitable trusts and the federal tax laws (Brier 1989: 239) . The social value served is the disincentive for private profit. As a practical matter, however, federal regulations do not uniformly ban profit sharing by nonprofit executives, and the guidelines that once defined permissible and nonpermissible profit sharing were made less distinct during the 1980s.
For some time, the Internal Revenue Service had distinguished between bonus compensation based on a percentage of gross revenues as opposed to net income, the latter having been banned but the former having remained permissible if reasonably related to services performed (Brier 1989: 239) . From the standpoint of charitable trust law, it is difficult to see how this distinction reflects a real difference in the incentive presented to hospital management. Whether a bonus is based on gross revenue or net income, the executive is rewarded for either maximizing revenues or minimizing expenses or both of these. Common sense dictates that bonuses only be given when the bottom line-that is, net profit-warrants them.
Nevertheless, even this restriction of profit sharing by charitably exempt organizations seems to have been weakened. According to Hranchak (1985) , an internal IRS document dated February 1980 said that percentage-of-income bonuses under ERISA-qualified plans would not necessarily jeopardize tax-exempt status. This position was subsequently stated in the IRS's private letter ruling to a 501(c)(3) charitable purpose organization, Pr. Ltr. Rul. 84-42-064 (July 18, 1984) . As a result, the present answer to whether a profit-sharing plan is consistent with tax exemption under federal law now turns largely on the limitation that the total compensation be "reasonable" in relation to the services rendered. This private letter ruling leaves open the question of whether reasonableness can be determined with reference to the compensation packages of similar for-profit organizations.
The IRS cautions that its private letter rulings should not be taken as precedent, but this does not prevent tax attorneys from using them as the basis for advice to their clients in the absence of weightier authority. Evidence that this change in the IRS position regarding profit sharing has influenced executive compensation in charitable hospitals appeared in the American Society for Healthcare Resources Administration's 1991 Management Compensation Study. A report of this study noted that "the use of incentive plans in health care was so infrequent a decade ago that information on the subject was rarely collected" (Williams and Coolidge 1991: 26) . Now, however, the study found that 49 percent of hospitals (including 65 percent of for-profits and over half of private nonprofits) reported the use of top executives' incentive plans. This report credited the "explosive rate" at which hospitals were implementing such plans to the recent relaxation of IRS guidelines for executive compensation by tax-exempt organizations (Williams and Coolidge 1991: 24, 27 ).
The policy objectives for this reinterpretation were not articulated in a process of legislation or rule making. However, the change occurred during a time when the Reagan administration's policy rhetoric favored competition and private entrepreneurship. Thus, plausibly, the goal of liberalizing profit sharing in exempt organizations was to enhance efficiency by rewarding managerial performance on fiscal criteria.
Given the present IRS position, it does not seem that "reasonable compensation'' need be defined only with reference-to other nonprofit hospitals, thus permitting executive compensation to be similar in nonprofit and for-profit settings. This tends to elevate the private enterprise value of organizational efficiency over and above the social benefit value of patient trust.
State Judicial Decisions on the Charitable Exemption of Hospitals
Beginning in the mid-l980s, a number of states and municipalities have taken a critical look at their nonprofit hospitals. Some of the impetus for this was the decreased availability of federal funds to cities during the Reagan and Bush administrations, which forced localities to rely more heavily on their real estate tax bases. In some urban areas, large proportions of otherwise taxable private property are owned by nonprofits; and, among these, hospital owners are perceived as having larger and more stable cash flow than their other nonprofit counterparts. This perception, coupled with the changes of organizational character and social role that nonprofit hospitals have undergone in the past three decades, has made them politically as well as legally vulnerable to challenges against their charitability.
Three states have had highest-court judicial decisions on charitable exemption standards as applied to hospitals. The political motives for the challenges were different in each state. In Pennsylvania and Vermont, the pressure resulted mainly from the effect of exempt properties on municipal revenues. In Utah, competition among nonprofit and for-profit hospitals led to comparisons that highlighted their essential similarities and undermined the nonprofits' claim to charitable status.
The outcomes of the tax exemption challenges in each of these states were also different. Utah rejected the federal and common-law charitable exemption standard in favor of a stricter one. Vermont affirmed the common law standard. And Pennsylvania, having articulated a strict standard that rejects the common law as to nonprofits generally, is awaiting an opportunity to decide whether nonprofit hospitals merit an exception and a more liberal standard. It bears repeating that what was at issue in each of these states was not the hospitals' nonprofit status (which was maintained regardless of the outcomes) but their special status as charities exempt from real estate taxes.
Utah
The Utah constitution provides that "[tlhe property of the state, cities, counties, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for . . . chari- In the much-discussed case of Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) , the Utah Supreme Court decided that these statutes overextended the charitable tax exemption provision of the constitution. This court agreed with the Eastern Kentucky court that the economics of modem health care were fundamentally different from what they had been earlier in this century. But, unlike that federal court, the Utah court rejected the assumption that providing health services is intrinsically charitable. Instead it set out a six-point test to determine whether any organization qualifies as charitable under the Utah constitution:
(1) whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a significant service to others without immediate expectation of material reward; (2) whether the entity is supported, and to what extent, by donations and gifts; (3) whether the recipients of the "charity" are required to pay for the assistance received, in whole or in part; (4) whether the income received from all sources . . . produces a "profit" to the entity in the sense that the income exceeds operating and long-term maintenance expenses; (5) whether the beneficiaries of the "charity" are restricted or unrestricted and, if restricted, whether the restriction bears a reasonable relationship to the entity's charitable objectives; and (6) whether dividends or some other form of financial benefit, or assets upon dissolution are available to private interests, and whether the entity is organized and operated so that any commercial activities are subordinate or incidental to charitable ones.
P.2d 276 (Utah 1985).
Applying these standards, the two nonprofit hospitals of Intermountain Health Care lost their real estate tax exemptions. Though these hospitals were acknowledged to pass the first point of the test regarding stated purpose, they were found to fail on points two through four and were doubtful as to points five and six. The court found no evidence of the hospitals' being supported by donations and gifts for the year in question. It also found that the two hospitals "consistently generated sufficient funds in excess of operating costs to contribute to rapid and extensive growth, building, competitive employee and professional salaries and benefits, and a very sophisticated management structure, 709 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) . Even though in principle no patient was denied care due to lack of funds, the vast majority of patients did pay for care, and less than 1 percent of gross revenues was the value of free care given. Because of testimony about incidents in which uninsured patients had been refused admission, the court found that the hospitals might have restricted their charitable service. Finally, since the Intermountain Health Care system included a for-profit entity as well as "numerous forms of private commercial enterprise such as pharmacies, laboratories, and contracts for medical services," the court inferred a possibility that private interests had benefitted from the hospitals' income and assets, 709 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) .
The power to create tax exemptions in this state is legislative, and the statutory definition of real property eligible for tax exemption reads: "Real . . . estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or chari- Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352 (Vermont 1989 . First, this court said that the actual provision of free care is not a necessary criterion for holding charitable tax-exempt status in Vermont so long as the institution maintains an "open-door'' policy under which care is available to all who need it regardless of ability to pay. The court rejected the notion that an institution's funds must be derived mainly from public and private charity for it to qualify for charitable status. Its language on this issue recalls that of the Eastern Kentucky court:
[I]t is unreasonable to suggest that because modern medical institutions no longer operate in precisely the same manner as they did many years ago, they should lose their traditional tax-exempt status. We recognize, as have other jurisdictions, that the definition of "charitable organization" need not be locked into the past.
A.2d 1356 (Vermont 1989).
Thus, two state courts viewing the same significant economic and social changes in hospital institutions reached opposite conclusions about charitability. In Utah, the court decided that charitable service and associated values, which may have been assumed in the past but not clearly articulated by a court, were necessary qualifications for favored tax status. In Vermont, the court decided that these same economic and social changes gave rise to a need to reaffirm the intrinsic social value of care for the sick-a value so great as to justify tax exemption without the quid pro quo of charity care.
Pennsylvania
Article 8, section 2(a)(v) of the state constitution allows the legislature to exempt any "institution of purely public charity" from taxation. The legislature exempted from "all county, city, . . . and school tax . . . [all1
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hospitals . . . founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private charity," General County Assessment Law, 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. 0 5020-204(a)(3). Most early Pennsylvania cases interpreting the charitable exemption involved private nonprofit schools, boarding facilities, or old age homes-not hospitals; and these cases emphasized the particular circumstances and characteristics of each organization rather than the nature of services rendered.
The state's charitable exemption standards and criteria as developed through nearly a century of case law were summarized by its supreme court most recently in 1985 in the case of Hospital Utilization Project v. Pennsylvania, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985 . Under this decision, an entity qualifies as a "purely public charity" if it meets the following five-part test:
(a) Advances a charitable purpose; (b) Donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legiti-(d) Relieves the government of some of its burden; and (e) Operates entirely free from private profit motive. mate subjects of charity; 487 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 1985 .
This test is very much like the one articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Intermountain Health Care and would seem to lead to a denial of charitable status for many of the same reasons cited by the Utah court: relatively small percentage of charity care, vast majority of patients having third-party coverage, and similarity to or competition with forprofit enterprises. In Pennsylvania, however, the supreme court has not yet applied this five-part test to a hospital. The Hospital Utilization Project was a nonprofit organization providing data processing and analysis services to hospitals but was not itself a hospital or a subsidiary of one. Moreover, only three years before the Hospital Utilization Project case, the supreme court decided a real estate tax case in favor of a nonprofit hospital that arguably would not have met the five-part test.
In West Allegheny Hospital v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 455 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1982) , the court seemed to disregard facts or inferences that might have led to taxation had the institution been not a hospital but a school or an old-age home. These included the somewhat low percentage of free care, the possibility that the founding physicians had personally profited from the lease or sale of land to the nonprofit hospital corporation, and the absence of operating subsidies through pub-lic or private gifts. Instead, this court said in dictum that the promotion of health is a charitable purpose sufficient to qualify a nonprofit hospital as a charity under the Pennsylvania constitution. The later Hospital Utilization Project court did not dispute that assertion but surprisingly did not make any attempt to distinguish or overrule the West Allegheny case.
In light of the fact that no challenge to a nonprofit hospital facility's charitable exemption appears in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case other than West Allegheny, one rationale for reconciling it with Hospital Utilization Project might be that Pennsylvania nonprofit hospitals are held to a different standard of charitable exemption than are other nonprofit organizations. Interestingly, three recent trial court decisions concerning the charitable exemption of nonprofit hospitals rejected this rationale and instead held the hospitals to the Hospital Utilization Project ~tandard.~ An intermediate appellate court affirmed one of these decisions?
Divergence and Its Implications
The common law of charitable trusts and the social benefits associated with charitable hospitals are consistent, up to a point. They diverge where social benefit theory calls for "relief of governmental burden" in the form of charity care from hospitals, which is a requirement that the common law expressly rejects. The difference between these two positions is whether the functional purpose of nonprofit hospitals-care for the sick-is viewed as being intrinsically charitable. When it is viewed as such (as is done by the common law, current federal tax law, and the Vermont Supreme Court), the quid pro quo of charity care is minimized. On the other hand, when care for the sick is viewed as a service provided by nonprofits no better or worse than by for-profits, the level of measurable care for charity patients becomes the distinguishing feature of tax-exempt hospitals. This was the driving factor in the decisions noted earlier of the Utah Supreme Court and the several lower courts of Pennsylvania. The choice between these two perspectives is more political and philosophical than legal; it also reflects the fiscal interests of government.
well compensated even in relation to for-profit executives. These are some of the very characteristics that state courts have cited when reevaluating existing charitable exemption standards.
At the local level, governments may be inclined increasingly to press state courts and legislatures for a quid-pro-quo standard of tax exemption for hospitals. For the most part, cities, counties, and school districts have a small fiscal stake in providing private nonprofit (as opposed to public) hospital care. Their concern for hospital efficiency and effectiveness may be less than their concern for these institutions' consumption of public resources. If more local governments challenge nonprofit hospitals in court or petition legislatures over tax exemption standards, more states will face the troubling value judgment about nonprofit care for the sick. As seen in both Utah and Pennsylvania, hospitals' success in these cases is by no means assured.
Thus, the divergence of tax exemption policies toward nonprofit hospitals depends on actual and perceived social benefits as well as on different fiscal pressures at the federal and state-local levels. The disagreement about the social value of nonprofit hospital care is not likely to be settled soon or with uniformity among jurisdictions. With the addition of conflicting fiscal interests and the structural propensity for fragmentation in the American form of government, the continued divergence of federal and state tax exemption policies can reasonably be expected. One consequence is that state courts will continue independently to face the decision of whether to continue real estate tax exemptions to nonprofit hospitals. If the experiences of Pennsylvania and Utah are guides, the likely tendency in other states may be toward increased stringency of charitability standards, especially in regard to charitable services provided to people who need them. All this suggests a future in which fewer nonprofit hospitals enjoy charitable exemption from real estate taxes, even while maintaining their state and federal nonprofit and exempt status.
